University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1989

The Objectification of Debtor-Creditor Relations
Steve H. Nickels

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nickels, Steve H., "The Objectification of Debtor-Creditor Relations" (1989). Minnesota Law Review. 2369.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2369

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Lecture
The Objectification of Debtor-Creditor
Relations
Steve H. Nickles*
Being named the Roger F. Noreen Professoris the high point of
my career,and I am nervous about being there - at the high point
One of the reasons is that I am afraid of heights. Part of that of
course, is actually a fear offalling. Another part is that the higher a
person climbs, the larger is the group that can view the climber's
backside.
Another reasonfor my nervousness resultsfrom having become a
Minnesotan. When life goes well for Minnesotans, they suspect that
their good fortune is undeserved, that it is a mistake soon to be discovered and corrected.
Well, I am a Minnesotan now. I own a snowblower and a roof
rake, and I drive a winter-beater. So I fear this whole affair must be
a mistake. It is a very happy mistake, however, to be named the Roger
Noreen Professor,and I hope it is a mistake that long goes undiscovered to anyone in a position to correct it
Being named to a professorship is, in a tiny way, like a very
traditional marriage. You take the name of the person in whose
honor the professorship is established. Forever after, that name accompanies yours for professional purposes. I am very happy to wed
my name to Roger Noreen's because, as I have already privately explained to Roger, his name represents extraordinarykindness, success, and loyalty that are rarely combined in such large doses in a
single person. So it is truly an honorfor me to hold his professorship.

INTRODUCTION
It is true that much of what I teach is not naturally appealing to most people. They are not fascinated, as I am, by the intricate details of priority battles between creditors claiming the
remains of a bankrupt business, or by the fights among banks
to determine which of them finally must bear the loss of yet
another check-kiting scheme. These contests, and many com* Roger Noreen Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
Remarks on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the Roger F. Noreen Professorship, February 12, 1988.
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mercial law problems, involve the application of specialized
rules addressing needs and interests of business and banking
that are foreign to almost everyone else. Moreover, the typical
combatants are finance companies, insurance companies, banks,
and large corporations fighting among themselves. The effects
of these battles on real people usually are too indirect to get the
public's attention, or to cause interest and debate in the popular
press, or to raise passions even among law students in my own
classes.
Frankly, to most people commercial law is like plumbing:
you need and must have it, but you don't understand or care
how it works. You don't want to see it, and hide it in the walls.
When you are forced to think about it, it costs you money. So
you hope to avoid having to think about it.
Commercial law teachers, then, often are treated as plumbers or some other kind of mere technician on the law school
stage, hidden in the shadows of the spotlight that shines on colleagues who teach more glamorous subjects. Center stage usually is occupied by the constitutional law teachers. They get all
the attention, and the Supreme Court appointments, arguing
such fundamentally human "people" issues as whether the government can regulate the bedroom activities of consenting
adults. Constitutional law teachers can freely showboat, unrestrained as they are by law.
In less "sexy" ways, every commercial law case affects real
people no matter how obscure the issue or rule of law, or how
impersonal the parties. Whenever a bank or other business
loses a commercial law dispute, it loses money, and this loss affects real people. Investors lose money. Employees lose jobs.
Farmers lose a way of life, and in some cases, lose life itself.
Determining risks and losses in business and banking may
be less glamorous than deciding constitutional rights, but the
process of shifting wealth through finance and commerce is
hardly less important to the real people behind the enterprises
that are on the losing side. And the fairness of the process is
an important factor in measuring the fairness of the society.
Commercial law has its most direct effect on real people,
and its fairness is most often publicly debated, in the law's regulation of the bilateral relationship between a creditor and a
debtor. This regulation mostly concerns the limits that creditors must observe in dealing with the debtor herself and with
the debtor's property for the purpose of insuring that the credit
is repaid.
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Debtor-creditor relations is the topic of my lecture today. I
will focus on what I term the "objectification" of the debtorcreditor relationship. First, I will define the concept. Then I
will illustrate it by describing three recent cases in which it has
occurred. Next, I will explain the reasons for objectifying
debtor-creditor relations in those cases. The reasoning is incestuous and is powered by a single concern. Finally, I will consider the desirability of objectification as it has occurred in the
cases described.
I. BACKGROUND
To a very large extent, the law has delegated to the debtor
and creditor themselves the job of regulating their relationship.
That is to say, the parties define, by contract between them,
when and what the creditor can do in order to secure repayment. The standards or rules they must follow to avoid civil
sanctions are those that the parties have legislated for themselves. Whether the creditor or debtor acts illegally, so as to
justify the state coming to the other's aid, depends on whether
there has been compliance with, or breach of, the contract. In
short, the law that governs the debtor-creditor relation traditionally has been the law of the parties' contract.
Concern is growing, however, especially among lenders,
that the freedom of creditors and debtors to regulate their conduct by their own contract is narrowing. The worry is not
about debtor-creditor relationships involving consumers. Consumer credit transactions have long been heavily regulated by
statute and judicial rules so as to limit substantially the kinds
of creditor conduct that can be contractually sanctioned. Moreover, to most lenders, consumer credit transactions are relatively unimportant compared to commercial lending and
lending services, so that limits on creditor conduct toward consumer debtors that might increase risks and costs are not seriously threatening.
The lenders' worry is about growing limits on contractually
privileged creditor conduct in commercial transactions involving business debtors: from farmers to other small businesses to
large manufacturing enterprises. Creditors and debtors in commercial transactions have, until now, generally been left alone
to regulate their relationship however they wish through mutual agreement, within limits that are so broad that they seldom abridge contractual power in the typical situation.
The worry about a narrowing of this power is not caused by
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legislatures enacting new statutes, nor by the courts developing
new legal theories of judge-made law. Rather, the worry is
caused by the courts applying old law in new ways: refining
and redefining the substance or application of established legal
principles - some statutory, some common law - so that there
is creditor liability for conduct - or an appreciably increased
risk of it - where before there was no liability or only a small
risk of it. This liability has resulted notwithstanding that the
creditor's conduct apparently was sanctioned by the contract
with the debtor. This reworking of the law therefore has seemingly reduced the extent to which contractual standards, determined by agreement of the debtor and creditor, govern the
parties' relationship. In place of these contractual standards
are external standards - sometimes found in the lending industry and sometimes in the wider community as a whole against which creditor conduct is measured.
Resorting to external standards for this purpose, and
thereby displacing contractual standards in the process, is what
I mean by objectifying debtor-creditor relations. It is judging
creditor conduct by community standards in disregard of a contractual privilege to engage in the conduct. It is a lessening of
the immunity from liability provided by contract. It is another
instance of tort swallowing contract.
II.

THREE RECENT CASES

Let me briefly describe three recent cases of objectification
that are particularly worrisome to creditors, especially commercial lenders. I will describe them in an ascending order of concern, and thereafter will address two main questions they pose,
namely: what is the cause of objectification in the cases, and is
it desirable?
The first case is Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Lala.1 In this
case Peoples Bank extended substantial sums of money to Leo
and Donna Lala individually and to a couple of farm related
corporations they controlled.2 The Bank found itself undersecured, mainly on Leo's debts, and asked for more collateral.
The Lalas obliged. The additional collateral they gave included
their homestead, on which both Leo and Donna executed a
3
mortgage.
The court held, however, that the mortgage on Donna's
1. 392 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).
2. Id at 181.
3. Id.
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homestead interest was invalid.4 The stated reason was the
Bank's failure to fully educate Donna on what she was doing in
encumbering the homestead: in effect, giving up her home primarily for debts on which she herself was not personally liable.5 The law generally allows a person to use property, even
otherwise exempt property, to secure another person's debts.
The law does not generally require a contracting party to educate the other party to any extent. One is bound by what she
signs, especially in a business setting, which includes farming.
In the Lala case, however, the court found that a confidential relationship existed between the Bank and Donna, and that
the Bank thus owed extraordinary duties to her, including the
duty to ensure that she was fully informed about the consequences of her actions. 6 In fact, the mortgage contained a clear
notice of homestead waiver as required by enacted law.7 The

real reason the court invalidated the homestead mortgage as
against Donna was the "unfairness" of the transaction. Generally, a deal between parties in a confidential relation is subject
to review for substantive fairness. The law is clear that no such
relation exists between parties to a contract simply because
they are related as creditor and debtor, and this absolute rule
8
applies to a bank and a borrower even when collateral is given.
Any relation can become confidential, however, if a situation of trust develops between the parties to the extent that
one of the parties justifiably comes to depend on the other to
such an extent as to allow the other party's judgment to control
her own actions. 9 Such a situation had developed between
Donna and the Bank, because the Bank's president was a long
time friend and financial advisor to Donna, who was unschooled in matters of finance.' 0 She trusted and relied on him,
and depended on him to protect her interests. He therefore
had great influence and control over her.
Recognizing a confidential relation in this case, or using
any other device to invalidate the mortgage, was made easier by
the fact that the president got the mortgage on the homestead
when Leo, Donna's husband, was hospitalized due to an appar4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Idd.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 190-91.
at 189.
at 186.
at 188-89 (citing IOWA CODE § 561.13 (1985)).
at 186.
at 185-86.
at 189.
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ent heart attack.1 1
Judged by the gut, even a banker's gut, the Lala case is correctly decided. It nevertheless is unsettling to lenders because
the courts rarely, even in extreme cases like this one, put creditors in the role of confidants and thereby subject their contracts to the test of "fairness" according to external standards.
The second case, KM. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,' 2 is harder
and more worrisome to creditors. Irving Trust agreed to lend
K.M.C., a grocery wholesaler, as much as $3.5 million. At a
time when K.M.C.'s debt to Irving Trust was only about $2.5
million, K.M.C. asked for an additional $800,000. The loan officer was honestly convinced that even with the additional
$800,000, K.M.C. could not meet its debts to suppliers and that
the company was doomed to financial collapse.' 3 Because of
this belief, and because the loan agreement explicitly allowed
Irving Trust to terminate financing at will, the loan officer denied the additional $800,000 loan. K.M.C. thus had no cash to
pay suppliers, and the suppliers stopped delivery. Consequently, K.M.C. collapsed. 14
K.M.C. sued Irving Trust, arguing that in refusing the additional loan the lender had violated an obligation of good faith,
resulting in K.M.C.'s collapse.' 5 Relevant statutory law defines
16
"good faith" in purely subjective terms as "honesty in fact,"'
which existed on the facts of this case. The lender had acted
honestly in these terms and thus had met the enacted law's
subjective definition of good faith.
The trial court nonetheless instructed the jury to consider
whether Irving Trust acted reasonably according to an objective
standard of good faith defined by the industry or community of
lenders. There was evidence that a reasonable lender would
have made the $800,000 loan.' 7
Surprise! Surprise! The jury found for K.M.C., assessing
damages of $7.5 million, an amount equalling the company's
value as a going concern just before the collapse.'8 The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, even though the contract between K.M.C. and Irving Trust purportedly authorized
11. Id. at 187.
12. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).

13. Id at 762.
14. Id at 754.
15. Id.
16. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
17. KM.C, 757 F.2d at 761-62.
18. Id at 766.
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the lender's conduct. 19 Once again, the parties' contractual
standards were seemingly replaced by external standards.
The third and last case, which is the hardest and most wor20
risome, is State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co.
Farah is a very large publicly-owned corporation that manufactures men's clothing. The company had annual sales exceeding
$100 million.2 ' In 1976, its chief executive officer, Willie Farah,
whose family started the company, was forced from office because the company had losses exceeding $40 million during the
22
preceding four-year period.
The new management immediately sought financing, and a
group of banks made millions of dollars in loans secured by the
company's assets. The security agreement between Farah and
the banks included a management clause that said, in essence,
that the banks could declare a default if the company installed
new management personnel unacceptable to the banks.23 The
purpose, which everyone understood and accepted, was to keep
Willie Farah from returning to power.24 This was understandable since under his leadership the company had substantially
declined.
Within a year, however, Willie began a campaign to be returned as chief executive officer, and he had enough votes
among the company's board of directors to succeed. The banks
were not amused. They informed the board that they would
declare a default if Willie was elected chief executive officer.
The Board realized that a default would put the company in
bankruptcy, so they did not elect Willie. They elected other individuals that the banks approved of, and the Board was recon25
stituted to include several people connected with the banks.
During the next year, the company performed poorly, losing by some estimates more than $50 million.2 6 The banks were
facing such large losses on the loans that they restructured
Farah's debt in a deal that eliminated the management clause.2
Willie then returned to power, and one of his first acts was to
19. Id
20. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
21. Id. at 667.

22. Id23. Id.

24. Id at 668.
25. Id at 671, 676.
26. Id. at 679.
27. Id-
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cause Farah to sue one of the banks - State National. 28
Farah won $19 million for losses supposedly suffered during the year Willie was not chief executive officer.2 9 The losses
were found to be the legal result of the banks threatening to
invoke the management clause to declare a default, which
caused the Board to elect management other than Willie, which
led to the election of managers who were inept leaders, which
inept leadership caused bad marketing and other decisions,
which explains the poor sales during the year, which produced
the loss. 30
Liability was technically bottomed on a tiny lie. When the
banks told the Farah Board that a default would be declared if
the company returned Willie to power, the banks had not actually made that decision. They clearly could have decided to declare a default if Willie was elected and, in that event, could
have enforced their decision or changed their minds and waived
the default. Either course would have been legally acceptable.31 The banks' wrong was in saying they had decided to declare a default - which they were contractually free to do when, in fact, no such decision had been made. 32 This lie in itself was technically a fraudulent misrepresentation - a tort.
This tort, however, was a slim basis for the kind and amount of
damages Farah sought.
The court also decided that the banks were guilty of duress
for threatening to invoke the management clause. The threat
in itself was not wrongful for purposes of duress because the
contract allowed the banks to do what they had threatened.
The threat was wrongful for purposes of duress, however, because the banks violated the duty of good faith that is implied
in every contract. 33 The banks violated that duty, which the
court defined according to an objective, external standard, because the banks' threat constituted fraudulent misrepresentation.3
So the tiny lie bred both fraud and duress, but duress ordinarily is not thought of as a tort; rather, it usually is a contract
defense. In Texas, however, people do things their own way.
28. I& at 668.
29. Ic- at 667 (stating that actual losses were estimated at $18,947,348.77).
30. Id at 691-92.
31. Id at 672.
32. 1d at 681-82.
33. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Vernon 1968) (imposing an
obligation of good faith in the performance or enforcement of contracts).
34. Farah,678 S.W.2d at 683-87.
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The court said duress is a tort, but that still is small support for
the outcome of the case.
The tiny lie was not yet exhausted. The court decided that
the banks had committed the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage. 35 The whole purpose of this tort essentially is to allow the recovery of the kinds of damages that
Farah sought and won. The interference tort is not clearly defined or bounded. It is committed when a person improperly
interferes with another's business activities and loss proximately results. Interference is improper when it occurs by improper means or with improper motive. In this case there was
improper means because the banks had made a fraudulent misrepresentation and committed duress.
That tiny lie certainly was a fertile thing.
The lie itself, of course, was not the first link in the chain.
Rather, it was the management clause in the security agreement that gave meaning and force to the banks' threat. So the
Farahcase is viewed by many lenders, and perhaps properly so,
as invalidating management clauses and the like.
The Farahopinion tends to support this view by suggesting
that fraud and duress really were not critical to the finding of
interference liability. The court said: even though "the lenders
may have been acting to exercise legitimate legal rights or to
protect justifiable business interests [which is usually a defense
to the tort of interference] ... the social benefits derived from
permitting the lenders' interference are clearly outweighed by
the harm to be expected therefrom. 3 6s This statement may be
the second most significant part of the Farah opinion. It implies that a creditor's interference with the debtor's business
may be improper and thus wrongful even when the creditor's
conduct is not otherwise tortious and is contractually permitted
and the motive is pure - if, on balance in the wider economic
and social context, the benefits of absolutely prohibiting the
conduct outweigh the costs of allowing the conduct. In such a
case, once more, external standards of conduct displace the parties' own contractual standards.
The most significant aspect of the Farah case is that any of
the banks' torts honestly could be said to be the proximate
cause of the damages recovered.
35. Farah,678 S.W.2d at 690.
36. IM,at 681-82.
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III. ANALYSIS
If you consider how these three very different cases are really very much alike, you will see the root cause of objectification in the cases: the outcome in each instance is based,
fundamentally, on the creditor's abuse of control over the
debtor. By this abuse the creditor forfeited the protection of
contract, and thereby lost the contractual privilege that
shielded the creditor's conduct. Thus, each result is largely
consistent with contract doctrine, not opposed to it.
The confidential relation in Lala, which was founded on
the debtor's dependency on the creditor,37 meant that the
lender effectively dominated the debtor so as to rob her of free
and independent will in the transaction between them. There
was agreement in form, but not in substance. There was missing the kind of real, deliberate, considered consent that is essential for an agreement to be recognized as a contract. So the
legality of the deal between them - the mortgage on Donna's
homestead - was not determined by their contract. In this situation, the law imposes greater duties. It expects the confidant
to abandon self-interest, which is furthered by the usual contract, and to act instead in the interest of the other person. 38
The lender in Lala, however, played Donna like a puppet in
getting her to hand over her homestead for the lender's benefit,
not Donna's own.
In K.MC., as the court there observed, the financing relationship was such that, as the lender knew, the debtor was totally dependent on the lender.3 9 The lender's control was
complete to the extent that the debtor's receivables were regularly impounded by the bank and kept in a "lock-box" account
as further security. 40 When the bank stopped lending and declared a default, the receivables were applied to the debt. So
not only was the debtor denied loan funds, it also was denied its
own cash balances, which were essential to keep operating.
So K.MC. can be explained in terms of Lala: dependency
and control created duties that transcended the contract.
There is a further explanation of K.M.C. The purpose of
the lender's control in KMC. was to insure its loans. In fact,
however, there was ample security for the loans that had been
37.
1986).
38.
39.
40.

Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Lala, 392 N.W.2d 179, 190 (Iowa Ct. App.
1& at 188.
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985).
I&
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made and also for the additional loan the debtor sought.4' The
reason for enforcing contracts is to give effect to the purposes
of the parties' agreement. By foreclosing when the security
was adequate, the lender went beyond the purposes of the
agreement and so went beyond the legitimate boundaries of
contractual immunity from liability.
The same is true of the lenders in Farah. The purpose of
the management clause was to allow the lenders to realize on
their collateral should a change in management jeopardize the
value of the property. They used the clause, however, to dictate the internal affairs of the company. This conduct exceeded
the purposes of the lenders' contract rights and they thereby
forfeited their contract protection. Moreover, because of the
lenders' control over the company, there was accompanying dependency, so that Farah,like KMC., can be explained in terms
of Lala: when there is dependency there are higher duties that
transcend the contract between the parties.
There is, however, something more about Farah. The lenders' illegitimate use of their contract rights gave them such control over the debtor that the lenders crossed the boundary that
separates creditor from owner. Creditor and owner are basically alike in that both put money into the enterprise. Yet,
there is a basic difference in how the law treats them.
Although a creditor's ability to recoup its investment is naturally tied to the debtor's success, the creditor's right to recover
from the debtor is not conditioned on the debtor's success. A
debtor cannot avoid repaying a debt to a creditor because the
enterprise failed.
An owner's ability and right to recoup her investment in
an enterprise is, on the other hand, clearly tied to the success of
the enterprise. Ordinarily, a company is not accountable to a
stockholder when the market value of her stock declines. The
owner's investment is at risk in this sense, while the creditor's
is not, because the owner is empowered to share in the direction and management of the enterprise and thus must bear the
consequences of her control.
When a creditor exercises control over a debtor's enterprise in such a way as to assert the powers of an owner, there is
good reason to treat the creditor as an owner by tying rights to
recovery to the success of the enterprise. Contract law does not
allow the form of the contractual relationship to obscure the
41.

Mcat 762.
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real substance of the relationship. If the enterprise fails under
the creditor's owner-like control, the creditor should bear that
loss as an owner, not as a wrongdoer, so that there is no need to
show a proximate link between the creditor's control and loss.
This would justify the damages in Farah notwithstanding that
causation was very weak or altogether lacking in that case.
In sum, Lala, K.MC., and Farah really are about creditors
having control that breeds dependency that, in turn, produces
an extraordinary level of responsibility and accountability to
debtors; and the cases also are about creditors using their control over debtors in ways that exceed the legitimate purposes of
the control.
Creditors do have lots of control, usually not through personal confidential relations with the debtor as in Lala, but
through contracts, as in KMC. and Farah,that give them the
right to grab the debtor's property - and thus collapse the
debtor's enterprise - upon default. Default is defined in the
contract, which always is drafted by the creditor. Indeed, the
largest part of typical financing agreements is devoted to defining default to mean everything and anything, including whenever the creditor feels like it.
With such a wide definition of default, the creditor is contractually free to cash out at any time. This invites - seemingly even permits - arbitrary action, as in K.M.C., and gives
creditors the power to meddle in the debtor's affairs, as in
Farah. But collateral is not intended to be used as leverage for
controlling the debtor's enterprise; rather, it is designed as insurance that can be collected when there is a real likelihood
that the debtor's ability to pay, or the collateral's value, is less
than the secured debt.
Cases like K.M.C. and Farah are simply saying that creditors must use collateral according to its real purpose; must use
the control accompanying collateral in line with that purpose;
and, factoring in Lala, that creditors must not abuse control use it beyond its purposes - whatever the source of the control
and without regard to how it is achieved.
Lenders worry that these three cases - Lala, K.M.C., and
Farah - and others like them, in objectifying debtor-creditor
relations, are limiting creditor conduct and creditor control
designed to reduce creditors' risks. Objectification thus increases creditors' risks, which will have the effect, ultimately,
of increasing the cost of credit and reducing its availability.
There is no empirical evidence, but the law-and-economics
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types will tell you that this effect is indisputablyintuitively inevitable; and then they will flash in front of your eyes an incomprehensible chart or graph that, they say, linearly proves
the probable reliability of economic intuition.
I have four responses that lead ultimately to the conclusion
that objectifying debtor-creditor relations so as to limit creditor
control is, to a point, desirable.
First, I am not sure that Lala, KMC., or Farah is a true
case of objectification in the sense that the parties' rules are replaced by external rules, or - put more generally - that the
cases are further examples of tort trumping contract. The reason I am not sure is that these cases might be explained as instances in which there was no true contractual agreement
between the parties giving the lender the rights and powers
that the lender exercised. I already have explained that this
lack of true agreement is behind the decision in Lala.
In KM.C., although the security documents empowered the
lender to stop lending and declare a default, the scope and substance of this contractual provision is properly determined by
reference to the meaning that the parties gave it. In light of
the reason for the power, which was to protect the lender's secured position, it is fair to interpret the language as conditioning the power on a genuine threat to the lender's position. In
other words, the power would not be invoked as long as there
was adequate collateral. Evenly construed, therefore, the
K.M.C. contract did not empower the lender to act for any reason, or arbitrarily for no reason, without regard to the true
state of the threat to the lender's collateral. So K.MC. may be,
in truth, nothing more than a simple breach of contract case in
which the parties' own standards were violated.
Farahcan be explained in the same way. Indeed, the court
noted that the evidence in the case reflected that the parties
never anticipated that the management clause would be used,
as the lenders used it, to work their will with respect to the internal affairs of the debtor. 42
Both KM.C and Farahwould be clear instances of objectification only if the conduct engaged in by the lenders had been
explicitly authorized by the contract through clear agreement
by the parties. But they were not such cases.
My second response to the warning that reducing creditor
control as in Lala, K.M.C., and Farahwill increase the costs of
42. Farah,678 S.W.2d at 686.
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credit is that I am not sure that chilling the kinds of conduct
involved in these cases increases risks that are meaningful and
important to lenders. Lala limits overreaching in circumstances involving vulnerable, individual debtors where risks
were miscalculated. It does not limit the ability of lenders to
take collateral before they make loans, at the time risks are
calculated. Nor does it limit the ability of lenders in regular,
arms length transactions to contract for more collateral if the
risks increase. The Lala case simply forbids lenders from unilaterally grabbing property that the lender knew, from the inception of the deal, would not be available as security because
of its exempt status.
KMC. says, at most, that a lender cannot abruptly exercise
its power over the debtor when the lender's secured position is,
in fact, not endangered. It does not limit the lender's right to
exercise its contractual power when the risks the lender sought
to protect against actually occur.
Farah simply adds that the power must be exercised for
the purposes for which it was designed: to allow the lender to
realize on collateral when there is a default. It does not limit
that fundamental right, which is the lender's basic and best insurance against loss.
Further -

and this is my third response -

even if these

cases do tend to increase credit risks and thus credit costs by
limiting creditor control, it may be that allowing creditor control involves a greater economic cost by stifling debtor freedom
to make entrepreneurial decisions. Preachers of economic analysis in commercial law, who are conservative in the sense of
protecting creditor power and position, have conceded - and I
now quote two of these preachers - that creditors should not:
place too many restraints on their debtor. Creditors lend money in
the first instance because the debtor has entrepreneurial skills that

they do not have. To take advantage of the debtor's skills, creditors
must give their debtor a certain amount of freedom. To give the
debtor the power to make correct decisions, creditors
4 3 must to some
extent give him the power to make wrong decisions.

I would add that creditor control that stifles debtor decision-making, and that effectively puts creditors in charge of
debtors' enterprises, may well rob the economy of wealth that
creditors lack the expertise to generate. Also, paradoxically,
control that is intended to reduce creditors' risks actually may
43. Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 30 VAND. L. REV. 829, 834 (1985).
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increase their risks by preventing debtors from putting their
greater expertise to full use.
Furthermore - and this is my final response - if I am
wrong and these cases that threaten creditor control do have a
net economic cost, that alone is not sufficient reason to disapprove of them. Balanced against the economic costs of limiting
creditor control is the social cost of allowing it: subjecting debtors to an overt form of economic slavery or, put more mildly,
transforming debtor-creditor relations into investment robotization where the debtor's will is subjugated, willy-nilly, to that of
the creditor, and the debtor is used like a sponge to absorb the
losses for enterprises that really are run by the creditors. It is
undemocratic; it is exploitation; it ensures the concentration of
wealth; it is wrong.
It is not wrong, however, for a creditor to end credit and
seize the debtor's property in satisfaction of secured claims
when there is a real risk of loss of the security. Objectification
or other means to curb creditor control should not go so far as
to dilute that basic right of creditors. The true and proper goal
of objectification should be to ensure that creditor control is not
used arbitrarily or to manipulate the debtor. The line between
proper and improper exercises of control should be drawn so
that a creditor is deemed to have acted rightfully whenever its
actions toward the debtor are authorized by a true agreement
and are directly related to preserving the creditor's collateral
against a genuine risk to that property.
CONCLUSION
You will have noticed that, in the end, my analysis becomes
a weighing and balancing of economic, social, and human concerns and values not controlled by specific and detailed legal
rules characteristic of commercial law. It appears that, alas,
commercial law teachers are like constitutional law teachers:
unrestrained by law.
In fact, law teachers of all subjects, practicing lawyers, legislators, and judges - the whole legal community - do the
same thing in the end: we argue the priority of competing interests, and those in power decide the matter. That, in the end,
is law.
My goals as a teacher are to urge students to see and appreciate a wide range of interests, concerns, and values; to train
them so that they can reliably interpret decided law to determine how those interests presently are accommodated; and to
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show them how that law can be reshaped to respond to changes
that argue for a different, fairer, more just accommodation.

